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Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does
Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical?
Dan Anderberg and Carlo Perroni
Abstract
We consider the implications of a lack of policy commitment when policies are chosen through
a political process and individuals are ex-ante identical. We show that politics, by allowing ex-
post distributional tensions to shape policy, can make it possible to sustain non-trivial equilibria in
which the commitment problem is alleviated or fully eliminated. How effective politics can be at
countering collective commitment problems in homogeneous groups depends on the nature of the
political process and on the extent to which private choices are public information.
KEYWORDS: Time-Consistent Policy, Voting, Taxation
1 Introduction
A vast literature, initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and others, has doc-
umented that equilibrium outcomes in dynamic environments can be extremely
ineﬃcient when policy makers cannot commit to policy. The literature has
pointed out numerous potential credibility problems, with applications rang-
ing from capital taxation and education policies to tax evasion and criminal
sanctions.1
Much of this literature abstracts from political mechanisms of policy for-
mation. Implicit in this omission is the idea that, if one can abstract from
population heterogeneity, then how policy choices are made is largely immate-
rial: any collective choice procedure that respects the Pareto criterion should
produce the same outcome as that which obtains from a benevolent planner’s
maximization of a representative agent’s welfare.
This paper shows this line of argument to be deceptive; the reason is that,
even in the absence of population heterogeneity, if ex-ante identical individuals
engage in diﬀerent actions, the resulting ex-post heterogeneity can give rise
to redistribution through the political process. Then, if suﬃciently powerful
policy instruments are available, it can become rational for an individual to
conform with the choices of others, so as to be in the group that benefits from
redistribution at the ex-post stage.
It is thus important to recognize that ex-ante homogenous individuals do
not necessarily remain homogeneous, even along an equilibrium path; as a re-
sult non-trivial equilibria can, through political incentives, obtain, in which
credibility problems are alleviated or even fully eliminated. The implication
of this result is then that, when characterizing time-consistent policies in large
economies, even if one elects to abstract from population heterogeneity, one
cannot abstract from politics; doing so can significantly bias conclusions.
The idea that individuals do not have to be diﬀerent in order for politics
to shape time-consistent policies has been overlooked in the literature. There
is a literature on the implications of politics for policy credibility,2 but, in all
1One of the earliest contributions to the literature on time-consistent capital taxation
is Fischer (1980), who analyzed a general two-period version of the capital-levy problem
where policy is chosen by a benevolent planner. The literature on time-consistent education
policies is more recent, and includes, e.g., Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996a), and
Konrad (2001). Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996b), and Boadway and Keen (1998)
look at policy credibility problems in the context of criminal sanctions and tax enforcement
respectively.
2One of the most influential ideas in that literature is that of strategic delegation (see
e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1994)). If policy is selected, after the agents make their private
choices, by a policy-maker who is appointed prior to those private choices, then, when voting
over the identity of the policy-maker, voters will elect a non-median candidate who has ex-
post incentives to select a policy which is close to that favoured by the median voter from
an ex-ante perspective. This mechanism relies on the presence of ex-ante heterogeneity, as
well as on elections being held prior to the agents choosing actions: in this sense it does
rely on commitment — not to policy, but to the identity of the future policy-maker. More
recent contributions, which also rely on the presence of ex-ante heterogeneity, are Gradstein
(1999a,b). Gradstein (1999b) shows, using a version of the capital-levy problem, that if it
is possible to commit, at the ex-ante stage, to the democratic rule to be applied at the ex-
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of those contributions, politics matter only insofar as individuals are diﬀerent
ex ante. In the mechanism we describe, politics do not aﬀect equilibrium pol-
icy outcomes because of the way ex-ante diﬀerences are reconciled by a certain
political process; rather, it is the very presence of a political process of policy
formation that generates heterogeneity, making possible an equilibrium combi-
nation of policies and private choices that would not otherwise be sustainable.3
We first briefly illustrate this argument by applying it to a familiar capital-
levy problem (Section 2), in a model where distortionary labour and capital
taxes are selected by majority voting and investment choices are fully observable.
We demonstrate that “reasonably good” subgame-perfect equilibria may exist
in this case, where capital income is not fully taxed and a majority of individuals
select a high level of investment.
The capital-levy problem, while useful for illustrating our general point, is
not ideal for exploring the above mechanism more fully. The reason is that the
problem exists in this case only because of an exogenous constraint on the struc-
ture of that instruments that can be used for ex-post redistribution. It could
be argued, however, that a majority has broader discretion in designing policy
instruments; the only relevant constraints should be those that stem directly
from an inability to observe private choices (and thus to condition policies on
them). Allowing for such endogeneity in the choice of policy instruments, in
dependence of the amount of information that is publicly available, allows us to
illustrates our second main point: that public information about private choices
generally has a positive value in the sense that it can help support more eﬃcient
equilibria.
To this end, we present, in Section 3, a second application. We consider a
social insurance problem where risk-averse individuals face idiosyncratic earn-
ings risk; the probability of favourable earnings outcomes can be increased by
means of private costly investments in education. After education choices have
been completed, a social insurance scheme (a redistributive tax scheme) must
be agreed upon before earnings uncertainty is resolved. In this model, the pro-
vision of social insurance runs against a moral-hazard problem, which gives
rise to a policy credibility problem: from an ex ante point of view, in order
to generate incentives to invest in education, less than full insurance should be
provided. However, this would imply ex-post ineﬃcient risk-sharing. In contrast
to the capital-levy problem, in this application the set of available policies is
constrained only by information. Moreover, the mapping from private choices
to earnings outcomes is stochastic, generating a standard inference problem.
We show that the more public information is available about private choices,
the more private eﬀort can, in general, be supported. As a consequence, the indi-
policy choice stage, eﬃciency can be enhanced by stipulating that tax changes must garner
the support by a super-majority. Gradstein (1999a) considers the value of public education
when there is ex-post voting over taxes.
3A related mechanism has been described by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) for the case of
renegotiation in a standard moral-hazard/principal-agent. What they show is that the possi-
bility of renegotiation can give rise to an endogenous adverse selection problem by inducing
the agent to randomize over actions.
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viduals have a common incentive to invest in a public information infrastructure
prior to making the private decisions. This result on the value of information is
in stark contrast with the conclusion we would reach if, absent heterogeneity, we
assumed politics away: then, we would conclude that more information might
very well lead to more ineﬃcient outcomes.
Proofs of results (unless outlined in the text) are provided in an appendix.
2 Time-Consistent Capital Taxation under Ma-
jority Voting
Consider an economy with a continuum of ex-ante identical individuals living
for two periods. All individuals have an endowment of one unit of consumption
in the first period and one unit of time in the second period. Each agent chooses
savings, k, in the first period, and labour supply, l, in the second period. We
shall assume that there are only two feasible levels for k: an agent can either
“spend” or “invest”, k ∈ {0, 1}. For simplicity, we assume separable and quasi-
linear preferences over first- and second-period consumption, c1 and c2, and
second-period leisure, z2:
(1) u (c1, c2, z2) ≡ c1 +
1
(1 + β)
(c2 + f (z2)) ,
where f is increasing and concave, and where β ≥ 0 represents the rate of
time preference. Denote the net return to investment by r > 0 and the wage
rate by w. In the second period the government must collect a revenue G
per capita through a proportional tax on interest income, τK ∈ [0, 1], and
a proportional tax on labour income, τL ∈ [0, 1]. Then c1 = 1 − k, c2 =
k [1 + (1− τK) r] + (1− τL)wl, and z2 = 1− l.
Given the above preferences, whether an agent invests (k = 1) or does not
(k = 0) only depends the net-of-tax return to investment. Let eτK ≡ 1 − β/r;
an individual will strictly prefer to “invest” (alt. “spend”) if τK < eτK (alt.
τK > eτK), and will be indiﬀerent between the two actions when equality holds.
We shall assume r > β; hence saving is the eﬃcient action and eτK > 0.
Similarly, labour supply depends only on the net-of-tax wage. A worker
chooses l so as to maximize the net income from labour income, less the disutility
of labour; thus define
(2) v (τL) ≡ max
l
((1− τL)wl + f (1− l))
as the net indirect utility from labour. The associated first-order condition,
(1− τL)w = f 0 (1− l), implicitly defines labour supply as a function of the
tax on labour income, l (τL). We shall assume that the elasticity of labour
supply with respect to the labour income tax, εlτL ≡ l0 (τL) τL/l (τL) ≤ 0 is
monotonically decreasing in τL.
A capital tax τK > eτK drives investment to zero and is therefore distor-
tionary, but the deadweight loss it produces is independent of the level of τK .
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Labour taxation is also distortionary in this model; in this case, however, the as-
sociated deadweight loss is increasing in τL. We shall assume that eτKr < G < r;
the second inequality implies that a one-hundred percent tax on interest income
would be enough to meet the revenue requirement if all individuals save; how-
ever, the first inequality implies that the required tax would exceed eτK . This
means that, since capital tax revenues are zero for any τK > eτK , a distortionary
labour tax must also be used alongside a nondistortionary capital tax. If policy
commitment were possible, the optimal tax structure would then have a very
simple structure: the capital tax would be set at the highest non-distortionary
level, i.e. eτK , and labour taxes would be used residually to meet the revenue
requirement.
Suppose now that policy commitment is not feasible. Specifically, consider
a sequential game where, first, agents make investment decisions; then, a tax
policy is determined by majority voting; finally, agents make labour supply
decisions. The game trivially has a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium
in which no agent invests.4 On the other hand, no pure-strategy equilibrium
in which all agents invest can be sustained: if all agents invested, then, at the
ex-post stage, capital income would be fixed, and all agents would unanimously
agree to fund G first by capital taxes; hence the capital tax would be τK =
G/r > eτK , which contradicts that agents would rationally invest.
This still leaves open the possibility of asymmetric equilibria where a fraction
θ ∈ (0, 1) of the population choose to invest — or, equivalently, mixed-strategy
equilibria where each agent chooses to invest with probability θ.5 Such an equi-
librium requires that agents be indiﬀerent between spending and investing, i.e.
it must involve τk = eτK . This cannot occur if the interim majority consists of
“spenders” (θ < 1/2). Since spenders have no capital income, their continuation
utility is simply v (τL). Therefore, their ideal policy would involve taxing capital
income first, implying τK = min {1, G/ (rθ)}; labour income taxes would, if nec-
essary, be residually determined. Hence, if θ < 1/2, the political process would
select a capital tax τ > eτK . Hence we can rule out mixed-strategy equilibria
with θ ∈ (0, 1/2).
This leaves one possible scenario: the “investors” may be in majority in
the interim (θ > 1/2). At the ex-post stage, investors face a trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and redistribution: since the capital tax base is fixed ex post, capital
income taxation generates no deadweight loss whereas labour taxation does;
however, taxing capital has an adverse redistributive eﬀect on the investors
themselves. Their ideal policy is that which maximizes their continuation utility
1+(1− τK) r+v (τL), subject to the revenue requirement τLwl (τL)+θτKr ≥
G. This yields the necessary condition 1 + εlτL = θ, which implicitly defines
4 If all agents spend in the first period, there is no capital to tax in the second period.
Hence any τK is optimal; any τK > eτK supports an equilibrium. Perfecting the equilibrium
(see Section 3 below) gives τK = 1. Alternatively, one could augment the model by assuming
that there is some exogenous capital income in the second period in addition to that generated
by endogenous investment; then, a choice τK = 1 would be an actual equilibrium strategy.
5For the sake of brevity, we shall hereafter refer to such outcomes simply as mixed-strategy
equilibria.
4
Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol3/iss1/art3
a monotonically decreasing relationship, τL (θ), between the investors’ ideal
labour tax and θ. τL (θ) > 0 for all θ < 1 but approaches zero as θ approaches
unity. The investors’ ideal capital tax is determined residually as
(3) τK (θ) ≡
G− τL (θ)wl (τL (θ))
θr
.
Note that τK (θ) approaches G/r as θ approaches unity.
Consider then how τK (θ) changes as we lower θ from unity. On the one
hand, labour taxation rises from zero, reducing the residual revenue to be raised
through capital taxes; on the other hand, there is less capital income to tax.
Provided that εlτL does not respond too sharply with the introduction of labour
taxation, the first eﬀect dominates, and τK (θ) will be less than G/r (and keep
decreasing over some interval as θ is further decreased towards θ = 1/2). Then,
if there is a θ0 > 1/2 such that τK
¡
θ0
¢
= eτK , a mixed-strategy equilibrium
where a majority of agents invest can be supported.
Figure 1 shows what happens as G is increased from the critical revenue
requirement G ≡ eτKr = r − β (the largest revenue that can be raised by
nondistortionary capital income taxes alone). As G is increased to G0 > G, it is
no longer possible to sustain an equilibrium with θ = 1. However, a new mixed-
strategy equilibrium with θ = θ0, close to unity, appears. If everyone saves with
probability θ0, then, ex post, investors are in majority, and will optimally vote for
the capital tax τK
¡
θ0
¢
= eτK , which, when rationally expected, makes everyone
indiﬀerent between investing and spending, and hence willing to randomize.
Such a mixed-strategy equilibrium is not fully eﬃcient, but it dominates the
pure-strategy equilibrium with θ = 0, as it features a lower labour tax rate —
hence a lower deadweight loss from labour taxation — and higher investment
— hence a lower deadweight loss from capital taxation. Thus, a “nearly eﬃ-
cient” outcome can still be supported if tax policies are selected by majority
voting, although very ineﬃcient outcomes, where capital income would face a
one-hundred percent tax, are still possible. Yet, if we abstracted from voting
on the grounds that agents are ex-ante identical, we would reach the conclusion
that the full taxation of capital is the only time-consistent equilibrium policy.
The extent to which politics can help overcome policy credibility problems
depends on the specific characteristics of the political process. To see this, con-
sider, as an example, a simple version of electoral uncertainty and “ideology”
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1998, Persson and Tabellini,
2000). As in our preceding discussion, we consider a sequence where elections
are held after the agents choose investment. Suppose that there are two politi-
cal candidates, A and B, each purely oﬃce-motivated and able to commit to a
platform (τ jK , τ
j
L), j ∈ {A,B}, prior to elections. Candidates diﬀer along some
dimension which is unrelated to tax policy but which aﬀects how agents rank
them; agents, however, only learn about candidates’ characteristics after making
their investment decisions and after candidates have committed to a certain tax
policy platform. This can be modelled by making an agent’s continuation utility
depend on a candidate’s type through additive taste shocks, both individual-
specific (σi) and economy-wide (δ), that are independently and unimodally dis-
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τΚ
θ
0.5 1
G′/r
θ′
τΚ
∼
Savers’ ideal capital tax, τΚ(θ)
G/r
Figure 1: Mixed-strategy equilibrium in the capital-levy problem.
tributed and are revealed to agents after investment choices have been made and
policy platforms have been chosen. Then, whether an agent votes for candidate
A or candidate B will depend on each candidate’s announced policy as well as
on the taste shocks: an agent i who has not invested in the first period will vote
for A if and only if v(τAL) > v(τ
B
L ) + σ
i + δ; and an agent i who has invested
will vote for A if and only if (1− τAK)r + v(τAL) > (1− τBK)r + v(τBL ) + σi + δ.
In this scenario, each candidate will choose the tax policy platform that max-
imizes the probability of electoral success, given the policy announced by the
other candidate, and given θ. It can be shown that, when the σis are identically
distributed, in a symmetric equilibrium, each candidate chooses the platform
that maximizes the sum of the continuation utilities of all the agents in the
economy; in other words, this political process implies that the interim utilitar-
ian optimum will be implemented. This leads to capital being taxed first, i.e.
τK = min {1, G/ (θr)} > eτK . But this removes investment incentives: in the
unique equilibrium no one invests. The problem here is that the electoral un-
certainty moderates the policy: the political process does not strongly privilege
the majority, and hence weakens the tendency to conformity.
How eﬀective politics can be at sustaining non-trivial policy equilibria in
homogeneous groups also depends on the extent to which policies can favour
the majority at the expense of the minority. This, in turn, depends on which
policy tools are available. In the capital-levy example, the limited set of tax
instruments at the majority’s disposal limits their ability to redistribute, and
therefore reduces the pressure toward conformity which makes high-investment
outcomes possible.6 However, more generally, the set of available policy tools
6 If, for example, a majority consisting of investors ( > 1/2) can levy a labour income
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should depend on what information is available about private choices. This
raises the question if more information is generally a good thing. In order to
consider this we turn to a second application.
3 Education, Social Insurance, and Information
Our second application which is chosen to highlight the positive role played
by information involves a moral-hazard problem stemming from redistributive
taxation. We shall describe a model where individuals face idiosyncratic earn-
ings risk, and where the probability of unfavourable earnings outcomes can be
reduced by costly private investment in education (the ex-ante stage). After
private education choices have been made, there is still scope for social risk
pooling, which can be realized through a system of redistributive taxes (social
insurance, chosen at the ex-post stage). In this scenario, unless a system of
redistributive taxes can be committed to at the ex-ante stage, incentives on
education choices will be disregarded by ex-post risk sharing decisions.
3.1 Education and Earnings Insurance
In the first period each agent chooses an education level or “eﬀort” level h ∈
{h1, h2}, where h2 > h1. In the second period the agents work, inelastically
supplying one unit of labour. Earnings in the second period are a random vari-
able w ∈ {w1, w2}, with w2 > w1, whose probability distribution is independent
across consumers but is conditional on first-period eﬀort. Specifically, denoting
the probability of wi given eﬀort hk by πki ∈ (0, 1), i, k = 1, 2, we shall assume
that π22 > π
1
2, i.e. a higher level of first-period eﬀort raises the probability of
experiencing earnings w2. Agents derive utility from consumption and disu-
tility from eﬀort: given consumption c and eﬀort hk, an agent obtains utility
u(c)− gk, where u is increasing and concave, and where gk denotes the utility
cost of eﬀort hk. We shall assume that the high eﬀort is more costly — g2 > g1 —
but eﬃcient under perfect risk-sharing —
P
i(π
2
i − π1i )wi > g2− g1. Henceforth,
an agent’s “type” in the second period will refer to her first-period eﬀort choice,
i.e. a type-k agent is an agent who has exerted eﬀort hk, k = 1, 2.
Social pooling of income risk is realized in practice through redistributive
taxes and transfers; for the purpose of our analysis, however, it is convenient to
model social insurance directly in terms of state-contingent consumption levels.
Under such a scheme, consumption can be conditioned on earnings, which are
assumed to be fully observable, as well as on any other observable signals that are
received ex post along with earnings realizations, and which may be correlated
with eﬀort.
Such auxiliary information will be modelled as generally as possible, relying
surtax to be paid exclusively by non-investors, then an eﬃcient outcome with  = 1 may be
sustainable: all individuals would choose to invest even if τK > τ˜K in order to avoid incurring
the labour income surtax — a redistributive instrument which the majority would rationally
choose to exploit ex post.
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on the notion of signal structure, which associates a probability to a certain
signal being sent by an agent of a certain type. A signal structure σ thus consists
of a combination of a finite signal space, S, and a probability distribution, f ,
over signals, where fkj represents the probability that a type-k agent sends the
signal sj ∈ S. We shall also use the notation Sk to denote the support of
the signal distribution given eﬀort hk — i.e. the smallest subset of S that has
probability one given eﬀort hk. The signal structure σ ≡ (S, f) can be thought
of as being exogenous, or, alternatively, as being the result of a costly investment
in collective infrastructure (see below).
Given the above definitions, an insurance contract, C, can then be described
as a mapping assigning a consumption level cij to each possible earnings/signal
combination (wi, sj). In principle, more than one contract may be oﬀered as part
of a social insurance scheme, with each agent having a choice amongst contracts;
a social insurance system can thus generally be described as a menu of contracts.
Since the social insurance system is put in place before any signals or earnings
outcomes are realized — when agents are indistinguishable from each other —
we shall impose a basic anonymity requirement: all agents must be oﬀered the
same menu of contracts. Also, in order to be feasible, a social insurance system
must satisfy an aggregate resource constraint. Since the economy is large and all
risk is idiosyncratic, there is no aggregate uncertainty; therefore, we can simply
require that the economy’s resource constraint must hold in expectations. Using
w¯k ≡
P
i π
k
iwi to denote the expected income for a type-k agent, θ
k to denote
the probability that an agent chooses eﬀort hk in a symmetric outcome, and
Ck to denote the contract chosen by type-k agents (from the available menu of
contracts), the resource constraint can be expressed as
(4)
X
k
θk
¡
w¯k −
X
j
X
i
fkj π
k
i c
k
ij
¢
≥ 0.
3.2 Policy Preferences and Voting
We restrict our attention to a scenario where decisions on social insurance at the
ex-post stage — i.e. after education choices — are taken by majority voting. At
that stage, there can only be two voter types, low-eﬀort individuals and high-
eﬀort individuals. Then, each agent can do no better than to vote for the menu
of insurance contracts that maximizes her type’s continuation utility, given the
distribution of types in the economy; consequently no menu of contracts can
defeat the menu that is optimal from the point of view of the interim majority
type.7
Given that there are at most two ex-post types, we can, without loss of
generality, restrict the number of contracts in a menu to two. Hence, assume
that each agent votes for a menu consisting of one contract, Ckk, intended for
7With two voter types, a majoritarian outcome is consistent with a broad class of political
mechanisms. A benefit of using more realistic models of the political process, such as citizen-
candidate models, would be that they can better handle generalizations to more than two
available actions (owing to the fact that they have better equilibrium existence properties).
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her own type, and one, Ckk
0
, intended for the other type. Let the menu favoured
by type-k agents be denoted by Ck ≡ (Ckk, Ckk0). Eﬀort is private information
at the voting stage — no signals have yet been observed — and so the menu Ck
must induce type k0 to self-select.8 , 9
Let
(5) vk(C) ≡
X
j
X
i
fkj π
k
i u(cij)
denote the expected utility of consumption for a type-k agent in a contract C.
Given beliefs θ = (θ1, θ2) concerning the composition of the population, the
optimal menu from the point of view of a type-k agent is then a solution to
(6) max
Ck
vk
¡
Ckk
¢
s.t. (4) and vk
0¡
Ckk
0¢− vk0 ¡Ckk¢ ≥ 0.10
Denote the solution by Ck (θ) =
³
Ckk (θ) , Ckk
0
(θ)
´
. Two observations can
immediately be made about Ck (θ). First, pooling is not optimal; this follows
immediately from the fact that the two types have diﬀerent probability distrib-
utions over earnings/signal combinations. Second, the self-selection constraint
is binding at the optimum: if it were not, then type k0 would be oﬀered zero
consumption. Moreover, type k
0
is always oﬀered full insurance. The menu
Ck (θ) then induces expected consumption utilities vkk (θ) ≡ vk ¡Ckk (θ)¢ and
vkk
0
(θ) ≡ vk0
³
Ckk
0
(θ)
´
(the first superscript refers to the type casting the vote
and the second superscript to the type aﬀected).
Any type’s ideal menu always provide her type with a higher continuation
utility than that provided to the other type. The proof is omitted.11
Lemma 1 vkk(θ) > vkk
0
(θ) for any distribution of types θ and k = 1, 2.
In general, voters will trade oﬀ consumption risk for higher expected con-
sumption, but as the fraction of any type approaches unity, the contract that
agents of a certain type would choose for themselves approaches full insurance:
the only reason why type-k agents would choose, for themselves, a contract with
8The own self-selection constraint can easily be shown never to bind.
9We abstract from interim participation constraints, i.e. from the possibility that agents
may opt out of the social insurance scheme if it leaves them with a lower expected consumption
utility than if they remain fully uninsured. The presence of an interim participation constraint,
if anything, weakens the redistributive power of social insurance, and hence the pressure
toward conformity that majority voting can exercise on the minority. Nevertheless, it can
be shown that results analogous to those we obtain for the no opt-out case (Propositions 1-3
below) apply to a scenario where individuals can opt out.
10The problem is one of provision of insurance under adverse selection with two risk groups.
Indeed, Problem (6) can be viewed as characterizing a particular constrained Pareto-eﬃcient
allocation: the allocation that maximizes the utility for type k.
11Type-k agents oﬀer type k0-agents full insurance, and oﬀer themselves an incomplete
insurance contract which assigns high consumption-levels to earnings/signal combinations
that are relatively likely for type k. The result then follows immediately from the fact that
the self-selection constraint on type k0 is binding.
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consumption risk is that doing so may relax the self-selection constraint for the
other type and thus allow them to obtain a higher expected level of consump-
tion; but, as θk approaches unity, the gain to doing so vanishes. The contract
Ckk therefore converges to a constant consumption level, which, by the budget
constraint, must equal w¯k. Note, however, that a positive level of consumption
need only be oﬀered to agents who send type-k compatible signals, i.e. signals
in the set Sk. For any other signal it is optimal for k-type agents to assign zero
consumption.
3.3 Comparing Signal Structures
The redistributive power of a social insurance system — and hence the pressure
toward conformity that majority voting can generate — hinges on what infor-
mation is available about private choices. To study the role of information, we
need a way of characterizing the informativeness of a certain signal structure.
Two such measures are relevant for our purposes: one measures how often an
agent’s action is completely revealed; the second is a more general measure of
informativeness.
Let kk0(σ) ≡
P
sj∈Sk f
k0
j , for k
0 6= k. In words, kk0(σ) is the probability that
a type-k0 agent sends a signal that is also sent with positive probability by a
type-k agent. Since an agent is revealed as being of type k0 if she sends a signal
that is never sent by a type-k agent, we say that the signal structure σ is at
least as revealing as σˆ for type k0 if kk0(σ) ≤ kk0(σˆ).
To see the relevance of this definition for our analysis, consider the contract
that type k agents prefer for themselves, Ckk (θ). As noted earlier, this always
optimally involves zero consumption on all signals not compatible with eﬀort
hk. It then also follows (from the binding self-selection constraint) that the
expected consumption utility of the other type will depend on how revealing σ
is; specifically, vkk
0
(θ) approaches
(7) v¯kk
0
(σ) ≡ kk0 (σ)u
¡
w¯k
¢
+
³
1− kk0 (σ)
´
u (0)
as θk approaches unity. Moreover, since type k0 is always oﬀered full insurance,
the utility level v¯kk
0
(σ) also pins down a limiting constant consumption level
for type k0, which depends inversely on how often k0 is revealed, i.e. on the
probability 1 − kk0 (σ). When θk is exactly unity, the own contract Ckk is
undefined for signals not compatible with eﬀort hk; neither is the contract Ckk0
defined. It is still, however, useful to assume that the agents vote for a social
insurance system that is the limit of Ckk (θ) as θk approaches unity.
The “at least as revealing as” criterion fails to rank signal structures that
never unambiguously reveal actions. A more general (and well-known) measure
of informativeness is the Blackwell criterion:
Definition 1 The signal structure σ = {S, f} is (Blackwell) more informative
than σˆ = {Sˆ, fˆ} if there exists a Markov matrix [β
ˆj] such that, for each s
ˆ ∈ Sˆ,
we have fˆk
ˆ =
P
sj∈S β 
ˆjf
k
j , for k = 1, 2.
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If σ is more informative than σˆ, it is also at least as revealing as σˆ for
both types, although the converse is not necessarily the case. As a standard
result it can then be shown that the more (Blackwell) informative is the signal
structure, the higher is the expected consumption utility that the type selecting
the menu can secure for themselves. Formally including the signal structure as
an argument in the indirect utility, we have
Lemma 2 If σ is more informative than σˆ, then vkk (θ;σ) ≥ vkk (θ; σˆ) for any
distribution of types θ and k = 1, 2.
3.4 Equilibria and Information
We next characterize the set of equilibria of the game, conditional on a sig-
nal structure, σ. The main results can be summarized as follows. If σ reveals
a low-eﬀort agent with suﬃcient accuracy, then there exists a pure-strategy
high-eﬀort equilibrium with full insurance (corresponding to the fully eﬃcient
outcome). Furthermore, there may exist, conditional on any signal structure,
mixed-strategy equilibria in which a majority of agents choose high eﬀort, al-
though there will also always exist a pure-strategy low-eﬀort equilibrium. In
general, the more informative is σ, the more eﬀort can, in general, be supported.
Recall the timing of choices: agents first choose education eﬀorts, possibly
by randomizing; they then vote over social insurance schemes; finally, earnings
and signals are realized and taxes and transfers are carried out. A behavioural
strategy for an agent thus consists of a probability distribution θ =
¡
θ1, θ2
¢
over
low and high eﬀort, together with a rule describing how to vote depending on her
eﬀort choice (and beliefs). The relevant equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium
(since there are no proper subgames): in equilibrium each agent holds correct
beliefs about the actions of the other agents and chooses a behavioural strategy
that is a best response to the other agents’ behavioural strategies. To refine the
equilibrium set, ruling out potentially “unreasonable” limiting equilibria, we
shall also apply a simple perfection argument: each agent is required to choose
each eﬀort level with at least probability ε; we then let ε approach zero.12 We
can start by noting the following:
Proposition 1 Conditional on any signal structure σ:
1. There exists a perfect pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where all agents
choose low eﬀort, θ1 = 1.
2. There does not exist any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with θ2 ∈ (0, 1/2).
Part 1 says that a pure-strategy low-eﬀort equilibrium always exists; hence if
any eﬀort is to obtain in equilibrium, there have to be multiple equilibria. Part
12This corresponds to the notion of an “-constrained” equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1989), except that we only require the agents to randomize over eﬀort levels, not at the voting
stage. Note, however, that in this application, the perfection argument does not in fact rule
out any equilibria; it does, however, pin down the specific contracts in any pure-strategy
equilibrium.
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2 rules out equilibria where a strict minority choose high eﬀort. The reason is
simple: if the low-eﬀort agents are in majority, the resulting social insurance
system will provide a higher expected consumption utility to low-eﬀort agents
than to high-eﬀort agents. Anticipating this, no one would rationally choose
the more costly high eﬀort at the ex-ante stage.
We are left with the possibility of either a mixed-strategy equilibrium or a
pure-strategy high-eﬀort equilibrium. For the agents to randomize over eﬀort
levels, they must be indiﬀerent between h1 and h2. This is compatible with
θ2 > 1/2, since the social insurance system selected by the high-eﬀort majority
then gives a larger expected consumption utility to high-eﬀort agents than to
low-eﬀort agents: v22(θ) > v21(θ) (see Lemma 1). The following result is then
immediate:
Proposition 2 If, for some θ2 ∈ (1/2, 1), v22(θ) − v21(θ) = g2 − g1, then
there exists a perfect symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, where each
agent chooses high eﬀort with probability θ2.
To understand this result, note that if all agents choose high eﬀort with
probability θ2, then, ex post, the social insurance system C2 (θ) is implemented
through the political process. Rationally anticipating this, each agent is indif-
ferent between high and low eﬀort at the ex-ante stage, and hence optimally
randomizes. Finally, since the agents are randomizing over eﬀorts, the equilib-
rium is also perfect.
It may also be possible to support pure-strategy high-eﬀort equilibria — the
fully eﬃcient outcome; however, this requires that a low-eﬀort agent be revealed
suﬃciently often. Note the intuition behind this result: if all agents choose the
high eﬀort, they will vote, at the ex-post stage, for full insurance over all signals
that are compatible with high eﬀort. However, they can credibly vote for a very
low consumption level over all signals that are not compatible with high eﬀort.
This discourages an agent from choosing low eﬀort if the probability of sending
such signals is suﬃciently high. Also note that, if such an equilibrium exists, it
is also perfect.
Proposition 3 There exists, conditional on σ, a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium in which all agents choose high eﬀort with probability one if and only if
(8) (u(w¯2)− u(0))(1− 21(σ)) ≥ g2 − g1.
If the above inequality is strict, the equilibrium is also perfect.
Thus, given a generic signal structure σ, three types of symmetric equilib-
ria may obtain: a low-eﬀort equilibrium, a mixed-strategy equilibrium where
individuals choose high eﬀort with a probability greater than 1/2, and a high-
eﬀort equilibrium. The symmetric high-eﬀort equilibrium requires that low-
eﬀort agents be sometimes fully revealed.
Intuitively, the maximum amount of eﬀort (measured as the fraction of
agents choosing high eﬀort) which can be supported relates to the informa-
tiveness of the signal structure. Suppose that the more informative is σ, the
12
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Figure 2: How more information can aﬀect equilibrium eﬀort.
larger is the diﬀerence in the consumption utilities of the type choosing the
menu and of the other type, i.e. suppose that vkk(θ) − vkk0(θ) is larger (for
each k and θ) the more informative is σ.13 In that case, we can show that the
intuition is correct. To see this, consider two signal structures, σ and σˆ, where
σ is more informative than σˆ. Recall that σ is then also at least as reveal-
ing (for each type) as σˆ. It then immediately follows from Proposition 3 that,
if σˆ supports a pure-strategy high-eﬀort equilibrium, σ does so too. On the
other hand, if σˆ does not support any high eﬀort at all, then σ cannot support
less eﬀort. Finally, suppose that σˆ supports a mixed-strategy equilibrium with
θ2 > 1/2. Then, as shown in Figure 2 (where ∆v2(θ;σ) ≡ v22(θ;σ)− v21(θ;σ),
and ∆g ≡ g2 − g1), σ will either support a mixed-strategy equilibrium with a
larger fraction of high-eﬀort agents or a pure-strategy high-eﬀort equilibrium.
The above results point to a second key point: just like public information is
valuable when commitment to policy is feasible, public information is valuable
when policy is selected through a political process after private actions have
been carried out. The reason is, however, quite diﬀerent: information has a
positive value because it enables the majority to divert more resources in its own
direction; this generates a tendency to conformity with the result that agents
may be able to coordinate on a reasonably good outcome, despite the lack of
policy commitment. This, e.g., reverses a result described by Konrad (2001)
for a scenario very similar to our second application, where redistributive taxes
are chosen by a utilitarian social planner after the individuals invest in human
capital. His analysis shows that some incentives for investment can be preserved
if the returns from the human capital investment are not fully observed by the
planner.
13This is suggested, but not implied, by Lemma 2.
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4 Discussion
The preceding analysis has shown that renegotiation of policy through a po-
litical process can help overcome the problems that arise from a lack of policy
commitment, even in economies with ex-ante identical agents. This is because,
when there is interim heterogeneity, the political process may allow a majority
to divert resources in their direction. This makes it attractive to belong to the
interim majority, or, stated diﬀerently, it generates a tendency to conformity.
The mechanism we have characterized relies centrally on the quasi-dictatorial
nature of majority voting, whereby the minority’s preferences are given no
weight in collective choices. This is the very feature that makes majority voting
a potentially ineﬃcient procedure in a static context; in the scenario we have
described, this flaw becomes a virtue. The enforcement role played by majority
rule in the presence of policy-renegotiation bears some conceptual similarity to
the idea of social norms promoting conformism (Akerlof, 1980); what makes
it distinct is that with voting-based renegotiation the pressure to conform to
the choices of others does not come from an exogenous norm, but is channelled
through the collective social contract.
Throughout our discussion we have stressed the idea that politics can matter
in dynamic environments even in the absence of population heterogeneity. This
does not mean that our findings are only relevant in situations where individuals
are identical in all respects. In practice, individuals are diﬀerent and have dif-
ferent policy preferences; yet, if individuals have reasonably similar preferences
along a certain policy dimension, it may well be legitimate to examine policy
choices in that dimension while abstracting from heterogeneity along other di-
mensions. What our analysis has shown is that politics remain relevant even in
such cases.
The argument has been formalized by focusing on binary first-period choices;
this modelling strategy makes majority voting robust and consistent with a
broad class of political processes. With more than two possible voter types, ex-
istence of a voting equilibrium under direct democracy may be a problem; how-
ever, many other models of political competition, such as, e.g., citizen-candidate
models, have better equilibrium existence properties and could be used in these
cases. Even with more than two available choices, however, a political process
will generate an incentive towards conformity whenever the political power of a
relatively large group exceeds its relative size.14 This is indeed a feature of most
14Given any general political choice rule that is consistent with majority voting — in situ-
ations where only two types of voters exist — and no matter how many interim voter types
there can be, if signals are suﬃciently informative there will exist an eﬃcient pure-strategy
equilibrium: when all individuals select the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, a hypothetical deviation
by one individual would only give rise to two voter types (no matter how many types could
conceivably arise); thus, if the political mechanism employed is such that the will of N − 1
voters always prevails over that of a single voter of a diﬀerent type (at least when N is large
enough), and if the signal structure is suﬃciently revealing, then deviations can be prevented
by the ex-post redistributive instruments that would be supported in an ex-post political equi-
librium, as described in Proposition 3. Also note that, by the same arguments that were used
to establish Proposition 3, it can be shown that, when more than two choices are possible in
14
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models of political choice mechanism, with majority voting of course being the
extreme example.15
Our second application has also highlighted the key supporting role of infor-
mation: the more observable private choices are, the easier it is for the majority
to extract surplus from the minority by conditioning taxes and transfers on any
observable characteristics that are correlated with private actions. This has two
implications. First, if individuals can costlessly choose amongst a set of feasible
information structures at the ex-ante stage, they will have a strategic incentive
to select one that is revealing as discussed.16 Second, at the ex-ante stage, indi-
viduals may unanimously choose to adopt an informative signal structure even
if it is not revealing and even if it is costly. More generally, an improvement in
the economy’s information technology, in the sense of an expansion of the set
of available signal structures, will if anything enhance welfare (measured as the
common ex-ante level of expected utility).17
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. The argument follows Grossman and Hart (1983). The
solution to problem (6) given σˆ involves one contract, Cˆkk, which provides con-
sumption cˆkki
ˆ on (wi, s
ˆ), and a second contract, Cˆ
kk0 , which oﬀers constant
consumption, c¯. Suppose then that, when σ is available, type k votes for a
menu
³
Ckk, Ckk
0
´
, where, conditional on (wi, sj), Ckk oﬀers consumption cˆkki
ˆ
with probability β
ˆj, and C
kk0 oﬀers a constant consumption c¯ on all earnings
the first period — and in the absence of interim participation constraints — for any possible
investment or eﬀort choice there exists a signal structure such that that particular choice can
be supported as an equilibrium pure strategy.
15Note that the probabilistic voting political model described at the end of Section 2 is the
other extreme example where the property fails to hold: in that case the equilibrium policy
maximized the sum of utilities, thus implicitly giving equal weight to all agents.
16 In the context of education choices, a revealing information structure could consist of a
system of public examinations of academic attainment.
17 It can be shown that the availability of costly signal structures may enable “reasonably
good” equilibria to be supported even if the choice of a signal structure is made ex post: an
ex-post majority may find it optimal to incur the cost in order to improve their ability to
redistribute resources through policy. In this scenario, however, there would no longer be a
presumption that an improvement in the information technology should be (weakly) welfare
improving.
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and signals. If a type-l agent, l = 1, 2, picks Ckk, she obtains cˆkki
ˆ with proba-
bility πli
P
sj∈S β 
ˆjf
l
j = π
l
ifˆ
l

ˆ , while if she picks C
kk0 she receives the constant
consumption c¯. Thus, by using a stochastic contract, the allocation chosen
by type k given σˆ can be perfectly replicated when the more informative sig-
nals structure σ is in place. Consequently, vk (θ;σ) ≥ vk(θ; σˆ). The outcome
can, however, be further improved. Ckk maps each realization (wi, sj) into a
lottery with expected utility
P
sˆ∈Sˆ β
ˆju(cˆ
kk
i
ˆ ); then, if C
kk is replaced with a
non-stochastic contract eCkk that oﬀers the same utility on each realization, i.e.
u(c˜kkij ) =
P
sˆ∈Sˆ β
ˆju(cˆ
kk
i
ˆ ) for all i, j, type k’s utility is unchanged (while keep-
ing the self-selection constraint satisfied), but the expected consumption is less;
this relaxes the budget constraint, thus allowing further improvement. From
this, we can also conclude that stochastic contracts are never optimal. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (1). Suppose all agents choose h1. Holding
correct beliefs, each agent then optimally votes for the menu C1(1, 0) and obtains
the expected payoﬀ u
¡
w¯1
¢
− g1. An agent who deviates and chooses h2 obtains
a constant consumption c¯12 ≤ w¯1 (see the discussion in Section 3.3); moreover
g2 > g1; hence the agent is better oﬀ not deviating. Thus there is a Nash
equilibrium where all agents choose h1 with probability one and vote for C1(1, 0).
This equilibrium is also perfect. Suppose that each agent chooses h1 with the
largest possible probability, θ1 = 1− ε. A type-k agent then optimally votes for
Ck(1− ε, ε). Since ε is small, low-eﬀort agents are in majority; by Lemma 1 they
vote for a social insurance system such that v11(θ) > v12(θ). Since high eﬀort is
also more costly, g2 > g1 it is indeed a best response for each agent to minimize
the probability of choosing h2. In other words, the described choices constitute
a Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy; moreover, as ε approaches zero,
this Nash equilibrium approaches the symmetric low-eﬀort equilibrium in the
original economy.
Part (2). Suppose the agents randomize over eﬀort levels with θ1 ∈ (0.5, 1).
In the interim C1(θ) is then the winning menu. The expected consumption utility
for a low-eﬀort agent then exceeds that for a high-eﬀort agent, v11(θ) > v12(θ)
(Lemma 1). But, then since eﬀort is costly, g2 > g1, the expected lifetime utility
of a high eﬀort agent is lower than that of low eﬀort agent, contradicting that
the agents optimally randomize over eﬀort levels. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose all agents choose h2 with probability one.
Each agent then optimally votes for C2(0, 1), which generates ex-ante utility
u(w¯2) − g2 for each agent. An agent who instead deviates and chooses h1
obtains expected consumption utility v¯21 (σ) defined in (7). Straightforward
calculations then show that an agent is better oﬀ not deviating if and only if
(8) holds. To see that this equilibrium is also “perfect”, suppose all agents
choose h2 with maximum probability, θ2 = 1 − ε. Each type-k agent then
votes for Ck(ε, 1− ε). If (8) is satisfied with inequality, then by continuity,
v22 (ε, 1− ε) − v21 (ε, 1− ε) > g2 − g1; hence it is optimal for each agent to
maximize the probability of choosing h2. Moreover, as ε approaches zero, this
Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy approaches a pure high-eﬀort Nash
16
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equilibrium in the original economy. ¤
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